The authors1. claim to have tested two hypotheses: "1) if the signatures of all AVs collectively were considerably better than using any one signature set individually
2) if over time it was reasonable to expect each piece of malware to be detected by all antivirus products."
The first hypothesis is blindingly obvious: taking 43 shots at malware, one from each antivirus product, will result in significantly more hits. No surprise here.
The second hypothesis should be stated more specific, since "... the results, just like the previous study, are limited to static signatures." I do not find it reasonable to expect antivirus producers to analyze, develop, test and distribute signatures for each and every piece of malware. After all, there are other techniques of detection and aiming for 100% coverage by signatures would constitute a waste of effort. And if a signature is to be developed, I'd expect this to be done shortly after a new outbreak. Again, this is exactly what their results show.
So, what's the big news?
1. R.M. Gerard writes in plural "we conducted a study" etcetera, so it's they, their and authors.