Unfortunately, this is not the case... The principal problem is that unlike in Unix/Linux, an already running process cannot be elevated. Ie. the elevation can only occur during process startup.
Take a look at NTFS permissions properties or task manager under standard user. They deal with it qute well, so why can't you?
This makes it a very limited, and (from a developer's point of view) hard to use feature.
I was talking about users, not developers. Specifically, I was replying to following:
In my opinion, this UAC thing will be major pain for many users and will be - what else would you want to do with it - turned off by many.
I understand that UAC may be difficult to deal with from
developer standpoint. But that doesn't mean that it is the same for user experience. And sending a message to users that UAC is bad is IMO wrong thing to do. One could say the same about just every security feature.
"Bah, antiviruses... They are reactive, they slow down your system... Just work under standard user account, have firewall, good backup, patch periodically, be careful about any files that came from outside - and you will not need an antivirus. Well, at least real time protection."
"Bah, NTFS..."
"Bah, standard user..."
"Bah, firewall..."
"Bah, updates..."
On a side note, even most security people inside Microsoft (whom I've spoken with) think that the main goal of UAC was to force developers to not make their programs dependent on running under admin only (i.e. make them work under standard user).
Totally agree with that. Because this is one of the main reasons most of the Windows world works under admin. Which is one of biggest Windows problems security-wise.
UAC is not a feature that will protect you against malware.
Well, while UAC will not protect you
alone (neither will antivirus protect you alone. Remember remote buffer overflow attacks? Boom, shutdown countdown. What? I have antivirus, how is that possible?! Well... antivirus is useless here as no file operations performed at this point. It will prevent local infection but you still will be rebooting every time remote zombie attacks you), so while it can't protect you alone, it can really help figting malware. Consider user working with admin rights on computer without antivirus. User receives an e-mail message with attachment that looks like a picture but actually is an malicious executable in disguise. If user tries to open this message, without UAC computer is owned. With UAC user will see confirmation prompt. "Hmm... why does this thing need to make system-wide change if it supposed to be just a picture..."
